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Abstract 
Although there are a variety of capital structure determinants studied in the literature, the  
life cycle seems to be considered of peripheral importance. In fact, capital structure 
overlooks that firms have different capital requirements across their life cycle. In addition, 
the finance literature highlights various theoretical models that explain how the firms’ 
life stages influence capital structure decisions, such as the Pecking Order, Trade-Off, 
Agency Cost and Diamond’s Theories. Therefore, our study analyzes a set of 117 Iberian 
non-financial listed firms over the period of 2001 to 2016 with the main aim of assessing 
the sample companies’ capital structure adjustment along their life cycle stages. We found 
a leverage adjustment rate for growing firms of 74%, 72% and 30% for short-term, long-
term and total leverage, respectively, and a leverage adjustment rate for mature firms of 
54%, 52% and 30% for short-term, long-term and total leverage, respectively. Also, we 
evidenced that Iberian companies in decline stages are going away from their target short-
term and long-term leverages, but adjust their total leverage with a rate of 72%. For the 
total leverage, our results support the evidence of Ahsan et al. (2016) and Rehman et al. 
(2016). However, for the short- and long-term leverage, our results were not consistent 
with the literature. Additionaly, we verified a low-high-low pattern for short-term 
leverage consistent with the Trade-Off Theory and in accordance with the studies of 
Ahsan et al. (2016) and Rehman et al. (2016). For the remaining proxies of leverage (long-
term and total), the patterns found were high-low-low. 
 
Key-words: Capital structure; life cycle stages; leverage; adjustment rate; panel data. 
JEL Classification: G32, C23, M21. 
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Resumo  
Embora existam vários estudos sobre determinantes da estrutura de capital na literatura, 
o ciclo de vida parece ser considerado de importância periférica. De fato, a estrutura de 
capital negligencia que as empresas tenham requisitos de capital diferentes ao longo dos 
seus ciclos de vida. Além disso, a literatura financeira destaca vários modelos teóricos 
que explicam como as fases de vida das empresas influenciam as decisões da estrutura de 
capital, como as Teorias de Pecking Order, Trade-Off, Agency Cost e Diamond. Assim, 
o presente estudo analisou um conjunto de 117 empresas ibéricas não financeiras listadas 
no período de 2001 a 2016, com o principal objectivo de avaliar o ajustamento da 
estrutura de capital das empresas da amostra ao longo das suas fases do ciclo de vida. 
Observámos para empresas em crescimento uma taxa de ajustamento de 74%, 72% e 30% 
para a leverage de curto prazo, longo prazo e total, respetivamente, e para as empresas 
em fase de maturidade uma taxa de ajustamento de 54%, 52% e 30% para a leverage de 
curto prazo, longo prazo e total, respetivamente. No entanto, as empresas em fases de 
declínio estão a afastar-se das suas estruturas de capital de curto e longo prazo target, 
mas, por outro lado, ajustam a sua estrutura de capital total com uma taxa de 72%. Para a 
leverage total, os nossos resultados suportam a evidência de Ahsan et al. (2016) e Rehman 
et al. (2016). No entanto, para leverage de curto e de longo prazo, os resultados não são 
consistentes com a literatura. Adicionalmente, verificámos um padrão de leverage de 
curto prazo low-high-low consistente com a Teoria do Trade-Off e em conformidade com 
os estudos de Ahsan et al. (2016) e de Rehman et al. (2016). Para as restantes proxies da 
estrutura de capital (longo prazo e total), os padrões encontrados são high-low-low. 
 
Palavras-chave: Estrutura de capital; fases de ciclo de vida; leverage; taxa de 
ajustamento; dados em painel. 
Classificação JEL: G32, C23, M21.  
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1. Introduction 
As the literature states, there is no universal theory of the debt-equity choice and no reason 
to expect one (Myers, 2001). However, there are several factors that can influence the 
choice of the capital structure of a company, such as growth, profitability, size and 
leverage (Pinho, 2013; Castro et al., 2015), among others. Hence, it becomes important 
to address the various theories that attempt to explain this theme.  
In accordance, the studies on capital structure started with the publication of Modigliani 
and Miller’s article, in 1958. That publication had such an impact that many other 
researchers investigated this subject, leading to the rise of other theoretical perspectives 
on capital structure decisions, namely the introduction of taxes, the effect of bankruptcy 
costs, the Trade-Off Theory, the Agency Cost Theory, the Pecking Order Theory, among 
others.  
By one of the others we mean life cycle, for example. The relevance and timeliness of 
this theme for companies, to which must be added the fact that conceptual theory and 
empirical evidence concerning the effect of firms’ life stages in their capital structure are 
not consensual, were the main reasons for the present study. Also, there is little expression 
of studies and articles dedicated to this topic in Portugal and in Spain and there is no 
consensus on the identification of each stage of the life cycle. Notwithstanding, the capital 
structure has not been given due attention because firms have different capital 
requirements over their life cycle, therefore, studying this theme provides a greater 
understanding on the optimal capital structure and on the best way to identify each life 
cycle stage. 
Hence, the general objective of the present study is to contribute to the literature review 
of the capital structure puzzle, trying to test whether the life cycle is an important factor 
to consider in the capital structure’s decisions. Thus, by studying the impact of the firms’ 
life stages in their capital structure we intend to conclude if the effects of the firms’ life 
stages on capital structure are associated with the Pecking Order, Trade-Off, Agency Cost 
or Diamond’s Theories and on the adjustment rate observed for each stage. 
Our research sample is composed by 117 companies and comprises data over the period 
between 2001 and 2016, through the export of financial information contained in the 
Thomson Reuters Eikon database. To measure the degree of the relationship between 
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capital structure and life cycle stages, we first start to apply the methodology to identify 
the firms’ life stages (dependent variable), which is the one used by Anthony and Ramesh 
(1992). Then, we estimated a regression model for the dependent variable leverage, 
according to three proxies: short-term leverage, measured as the ratio of short-term loan 
to total assets; long-term leverage that is the ratio of long-term loan to total assets; and 
total leverage, which translates into the ratio of total liabilities to total assets.  
Further, this dissertation intends to assess the sample companies’ capital structure 
adjustment along their life cycle stages, using a methodology also applied by Ahsan et al. 
(2016) and Rehman et al. (2016), who used a partial adjustment model with the 
assumption that the observed change in the capital structure is in function of the desired 
change. 
We found that growing non-financial Iberian firms adjust their leverages by 74%, 72% 
and 30% for short-term, long-term and total leverage, respectively. Mature firms did it by 
54%, 52% and 30% for short-term, long-term and total leverage, respectively. In what 
concerns declining firms, we concluded that, with the exception for total leverage which 
presented a high adjustment rate of 72%, firms in decline stages are going away from 
their target short- and long-term leverages. 
These results were consistent with Ahsan et al. (2016) and Rehman et al. (2016), 
evidencing that when the total leverage is studied, companies adjust their capital structure 
in the stages of growth, maturity and decline. However, when the short- and long-term 
leverage is tested, the results for the decline stage have shown that firms do not follow an 
optimal capital structure and therefore these results are not consistent with these authors. 
The structure of this study will proceed as follows. The second chapter presents the 
literature review, which addresses the main determinants of the capital structure, the main 
contributes on the life cycle framework and also some empirical studies regarding the 
relationship between both concepts. The third develops our hypotheses. In the fourth 
chapter, we describe the data and the methodology adopted. In the fifth chapter, we 
develop the empirical model, its results and its analysis. Finally, in the sixth chapter, we 
conclude on our findings, on our contribution and our recommendations for further future 
research. 
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2. Literature Review 
In this chapter, we present the key classical theories regarding the two main frameworks 
of the research theme: Capital Structure and Life Cycle. We also present some of the most 
recent empirical studies that approached the relationship between both frameworks.  
As the research subject indicates, it approaches two main frameworks: Capital Structure 
and Life Cycle. As both are usually studied separately, I decided to review the literature 
as such. 
2.1. Capital Structure 
Defined as the way a firm finances its assets through a combination of debt and equity 
(Schoroeder et al, 2005), capital structure is one of the most famous topics studied in the 
financial literature, even knowing beforehand that there is no universal theory of the debt-
equity choice and no reason to expect one (Myers, 2001).  
The first study of the capital structure problem started with the Traditional View released 
by David Durand in 1952, however, it was after the publication of the Modigliani and 
Miller article in 1958 that the capital structure study intensified.  
For Durand (1952), the so-called traditional view is based on the existence of a perfect 
optimal combination of debt and equity that minimizes the weighted average cost of 
capital and maximizes the market value of a company. The author also argued the 
existence of a relation between the indebtedness of a company and its value, as the less 
equity a company uses, the greater its profit maximization will be. However, it should be 
noted that higher indebtedness carries a higher risk, which should be reflected in the cost 
required by creditors and in the return on equity. In addition, this study lacks a formal 
model, so it is not representative of a true theory. 
Therefore, as mentioned, the real start began with the publication of Modigliani and 
Miller’s article, in 1958. In this study, Modigliani and Miller objected to what had been 
stated by Durand (1952), by arguing that there is no optimal capital structure and that the 
value of a company is independent of its capital structure. However, the authors’ approach 
was based on strong assumptions, such as perfect markets, investor rationality, 
homogeneous expectations, information symmetries, absence of taxes, transaction costs, 
bankruptcy costs and agency costs. Indeed, such assumptions do not represent reality. 
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In 1963, denoting a limitation on their previous study, the same authors published a new 
study, in which they revised and included the effect of taxes as determinants of the market 
value of a company, contradicting their initial idea in which they argued that the effect of 
income taxes was minimal and did not influence the value of a firm. With the exception 
of the absence of taxes, their previous assumptions remained in force. Hence, they 
concluded that a high income tax and financing expenses deductible in fiscal terms would 
mean greater tax savings which would increase its value of a company. In fact, the 
deduction of financing expenses would mean that the taxable income would be lower and, 
consequently, would generate less tax payable, which would certainly lead to an increase 
in the value of the company. This led to the conclusion that the capital structure is relevant 
in determining the value of a firm. In particular, it was concluded that indebtedness 
decreases the weighted average cost of capital and, consequently, increases the value of 
a company linearly. Therefore, its value is maximized with the minimization of equity. 
However, with the conclusion that the maximization of value arises when company’s 
assets are totally financed with debt, the authors warned that no company should be fully 
indebted. Hence, this model should also be interpreted with some limitations, since it is 
inappropriate to reality. 
A few years later, in 1977, Miller alone produced a model, under which he reinforced the 
idea of the tax effect on the capital structure by introducing the joint effect of corporate 
and personal income taxes. He concluded that the firm’s value in equilibrium is 
independent of the capital structure adopted. Moreover, he sustained that the two tax 
effects cancelled each other out, so the optimal combination between equity and debt does 
not change the value of a firm.  
Since the publication of Modigliani and Miller’s (1958) theory, a vast literature was 
developed to investigate the robustness of their conclusions on investors' indifference 
between debt and equity. In fact, except for Dybvig and Zender (1986), the literature 
concluded that the first Modigliani and Miller (1958) proposition fails to hold in the 
presence of market imperfections since factors/determinants that could influence the 
capital structure of a firm were found. Thus, capital structure decisions are usually 
explained on the basis of the following theories: the introduction of Taxes, the effect of 
Bankruptcy Costs, Trade-Off, Agency Cost, and Pecking Order Theories, among others.  
In order to clarify the association of each theory with the topic under analysis, 
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notwithstanding the scientific relevance of other themes, we will follow the structure 
proposed by Ahsan et al. (2016) and Rehman et al. (2016). 
2.1.1. Pecking Order Theory 
Based on studies related with information asymmetry and profitability, it was developed 
the Pecking Order Theory, which concludes that a firm orders its financing preferences 
as follows: first, a firm prefers internal funds; then, it choses external debt; and only as 
its last resource a firm choses equity (Myers, 1984; Myers and Majluf, 1984).  
According to the Pecking Order Theory, a firm does not pursue a target capital structure, 
but instead follows a pattern in its financing policy which can be changed according to 
its opacity of information asymmetry, levels of profitability and financial needs. 
2.1.2. Trade-Off Theory 
Contradicting the theory above, the Trade-Off Theory emerged, establishing that 
companies seek an optimal capital structure (introducing the static trade-off concept), 
which can be obtained through a trade-off between costs and benefits associated with 
leverage (in a perfect market environment). Notwithstanding, it should be noted that an 
optimal capital structure can be influenced by several exogenous and endogenous factors 
that change over time, especially across firms’ life cycle stages. Hence, according to 
Fischer et al. (1989), firms adjust their capital structure by making dynamic decisions 
(dynamic trade-off concept).  
In order to obtain a larger tax shield benefit, a firm should raise more debt, in accordance 
with the Trade-Off Theory, irrespective of its life cycle stage. However, the increase of 
debt will increase also the firm bankruptcy and financial distress risk. Hence, it is 
necessary to reach a breakeven point between tax benefits and bankruptcy costs.  
2.1.3. Agency Cost Theory 
Moreover, Agency Cost Theory is also mentioned as one of the most relevant explanatory 
theories of capital structure. It should be emphasized that this theory is based on the 
existence of information and interest conflicts, which may arise between those involved 
in the activity of a company, such as managers, shareholders and creditors, with respect 
to the use of free cash flows and firm’s resources. In fact, the companies that suffer most 
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from this are the ones that generate higher amounts of cash flows. This type of conflicts 
leads Jensen and Meckling (1976) to believe that the solution may lead to the use of an 
optimal level of debt, because debt repayments would reduce the available free cash 
flows, so managers would not have enough to invest in non-valuable businesses. 
In addition, the increase of debt in the capital structure is most of the times caused by 
agency costs, because debt “enables managers to bond their promise to pay out future 
cash flows” (Jensen, 1986). According to Agency Cost Theory, firms use more debt in 
their capital structure when investors seek to pressure management to use funds 
efficiently. 
2.1.4. Diamond’s Theory 
According to Diamond (1989), firm’s reputation can explain its financing preferences, 
since reputation varies during a firm’s life cycle. Effectively, firms in their earlier stages 
have less reputation, meaning that they have less confidence to raise debt, and they are 
also characterized by having high information asymmetry. As companies become more 
mature, they reduce their information asymmetry and eventually increase their reputation, 
putting them in a better position to raise debt. The same goes for companies in the 
declining stages, which already have a huge track record and a solid reputation that allows 
them a high debt capacity as well.  
2.2. Life cycle 
As observed in the literature review on the subject of capital structure, the life cycle has 
never really been approached as one of its explanatory theories. However it was 
approached as being part of some of the existing explanatory theories. 
Nonetheless, the life cycle became an interest to researchers approximately in the period 
when capital structure theories started to be developed.   
According to Black (1998), this theory is an extension of the product life cycle theory. 
Thus, in the same sense as products, companies usually progress through a set of life 
stages that start with birth and ends in death (Frielinghaus et al., 2005).  
Hence, it was approached, as a field of study, the organizational life stage theory, based 
on which several students tried to understand the firm’s development by its comparison 
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to human life cycle (Lippit and Schmidt, 1967; Adizes, 1979, Miller and Friesen, 1984; 
Black, 1998; Levie and Lichtenstein, 2008). 
Several models in the last fifty years were generated which differ, not only in the number 
of stages and their classification criteria, but also in the way of determining of a particular 
phase. Meanwhile, there are two problems in understanding and employing the concept.  
Firstly, there is no consensus on the definition of firms’ life cycle stages due to the 
difficulty in choosing the model to be used. There are those who propose life cycle models 
with three phases (Anthony and Ramesh, 1992), four phases (Miller and Friesen, 1980; 
Quinn and Cameron, 1983), five phases (Miller and Friesen, 1984; Scott and Bruce, 1987; 
Dickinson, 2005; Dickinson, 2011) and ten phases (Adizes, 1979). Secondly, there is no 
consensus regarding the identification of each life cycle stage.  
However, most of the theories and studies on life cycle agreed on growth, maturity and 
decline as the three stages of a firm’s life cycle (Rehman et al., 2016), what could mean 
convergence between researchers on this subject. 
To better clarify and help to answer these questions, Zhipeng, in 2006, developed a study 
called “A new methodology of measuring firm life cycle stages”. In this sense, the authors 
described the three most common used methodologies for measuring life cycle stages. 
The one approached by Miller and Friesen (1984) identified a five life cycle stages model, 
which is composed by birth, growth, maturity, revival and decline stages. For the 
classification of firms in each life stage, they applied numeric and descriptive criteria. In 
practice, they restricted the sample to companies that have been in existence for a long 
period of time (at least 20 years) and divided a firm’s history into representative periods 
by examining all relevant information about the firm. In addition, they used firms’ age in 
the definition of the birth phase. For the other stages it was used sales growth data. 
Zhipeng (2006) appointed as disadvantage the fact that researchers need to gather a 
tremendous amount of information on firms before they can identify and assign different 
periods. Also it does not allow a big sample (e.g. only 36 companies were studied). 
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The study of Anthony and Ramesh (1992) classified firms according to a three (or five) 
life cycle stages model, with three stages (growth, mature and stagnant) for univariate 
procedure, and two additional stages (growth/mature and mature/stagnant) used in the 
multivariate procedure. For the classification, four variables were used: dividends, sales 
growth, capital expenditure and age. They ranked firms on each of the four life cycle 
descriptors and grouped them into the life cycle stages through a scoring model. Zhipeng 
(2006) concerned with Anthony and Ramesh’s approach in classifying firms, due to 
ranking them among all the firms every year. In fact, for example, for a company in a 
weak growth sector, a sales’ growth of 5% may be high, but for another company in a 
high growth sector, this 5% of sales’ growth might not be so positive. 
A more recent study developed by Dickinson (2005), with a five life stages model 
(introductory, growth, maturity, shakeout and decline), the author used signs (positive or 
negative) of three types of cash flows (cash flows from operating, investing and financing 
activities) in each firm-year to classify firms in five stages. For example, a firm in the 
introductory stage should have negative operating cash flows, negative investing cash 
flows and positive financing cash flows. On the other hand, firms with positive operating 
cash flows, negative investing cash flows and negative financing cash flows should be in 
the growth stage. For Zhipeng (2006), like the study of Anthony and Ramesh (1992), the 
model of Dickinson (2005) has the disadvantage of being difficult to perform any time 
series analysis within each life cycle stage. 
In addition to the review of other methodologies, Zhipeng (2006) purposed their 
methodology, which they mention that would help to avoid the lack of generality problem 
of studying only a few organizations, showing that it can be widely used for big samples, 
quantified as more than “thousands or even millions” if needed, especially in finance 
researches. However, this methodology only uses two classification variables (age and 
sales growth).  
Recently, Dickinson (2011) developed another study in which were also identified 5 
stages, but now with a different designation: birth, growth, maturity, decline and revival. 
For the classification of firms in life stages, the author focuses on operating, investing 
and financing cash flows. It should be noted that this study was firstly used in a capital 
structure article in a study developed by Castro et al. (2015), which defined as an 
advantage of this methodology the possibility to observe the differences by stage and the 
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usage of operating, investing and financing cash flows. By considering these three aspects 
of the business jointly, this method overcomes the partiality of using just one discriminant 
variable, which is a commonplace in the literature. 
According to Gup and Agrrawal (1996), the life cycle of companies can present itself as 
a realistic and dynamic tool in the study of the financial policies adopted by the 
companies. It is certain that companies are born, grow and decline, renew and reappear, 
or may not survive and disappear (Kimberly et al., 1980). All businesses, throughout their 
development, have distinct phases, each with its own characteristics (Scott and Bruce, 
1987). The concept that firms evolve through a financial life cycle is well identified in 
the literature (La Rocca et al., 2011). However, several studies have been developed both 
on the life cycle and on the capital structure, but there are few that explained how both 
issues are related. 
2.3. Capital Structure and Life Cycle 
In fact, capital structure’s choice is likely to be influenced according to the phase where 
the company is in terms of life cycle, as financing needs may change with the changing 
circumstances of a firm (Damodaran, 2001).  
From its initial phase to a more mature one, a company should use progressively more 
debt (Hovakimian et al., 2001). These financing preferences were analyzed in the same 
view by Damodaran (2001), stating that expanding and high-growth firms would use 
primarily equity, while mature firms would use debt instead. 
La Rocca et al. (2011) also warned for the need of companies to look at the stages of life 
in which they are when they make financing decisions and strategies. This information 
relates to the fact that in their early stages, companies tend to have higher levels of 
information asymmetry, more opportunities for growth and a smaller size.  
Berger and Udell (1998) wrote an article in which they show how capital structure varies 
with firm size and age. For them, as companies become older and larger, their 
characteristics and ambitious change. 
In addition, the findings of the relation between capital structure and life stage can help 
better understanding how a firm financing changes over the time. 
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2.3.1. Empirical Evidence 
As already mentioned, there was little research focusing directly on the relationship 
between capital structure and life cycle stage theories, but in the last years there have been 
some empirical evidence on the subject. Below we present some of the most important 
empirical studies’ results. 
Frielinghaus et al. (2005) study the relationship between capital structure and a firm’s life 
stage for a sample of 81 South African private and public companies. They use the 
Adizes’ life stage model (ten stages) to assess the life stage of the firms. They find a 
statistically significant relationship between life stage and capital structure. In addition, 
considering that there is more debt in the early and late life stages than in prime, they also 
argue that the nature of the relationship supports the Pecking Order Theory of capital 
structure. Moreover, in contrast with the static Trade-Off Theory, the Pecking Order 
Theory suggests a high-low-high of debt ratio over time. 
Pinková and Kaminková (2011) investigate the impact of corporate life cycle on the 
capital structure of fifty medium-sized Czech automotive companies for a sample period 
between 2002 and 2010. In accordance, they classify firms on the basis of cash flow 
patterns proposed by Dickinson (2011). The findings suggest that both the development 
of debt-to-equity ratio and the development of current liabilities in different stages of 
corporate life cycle indicate the linkage between life cycle and capital structure. 
Furthermore, they considered that the Pecking Order Theory is related to the corporate 
life cycle issue, due to the funding behaviour of companies, which in the stages of birth 
and growth use typically more debt than equity. As for mature companies, the level of 
debt decreases, but it rises again in the decline stage. As so, they suggest a high-low-high 
pattern. 
La Rocca et al (2011) explore the financing choices of small and medium-sized firms 
through the lens of the business life cycle through a sample of 10,242 Italian non-financial 
small and medium-sized firms, not involved in a bankruptcy process for a period from 
1996 to 2005. Their results concluded that the Pecking Order Theory shows a higher 
degree of application. 
Alves (2013) studies the capital structure decisions from a sample of 1905 small and 
medium enterprises located in Castelo Branco, Portugal, from 2005 to 2009, verifying if 
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the life cycle is a relevant explanatory determinant of capital structure for those 
companies. The author’s findings point out that the capital structure decisions of SME’s 
located in Castelo Branco follow the Pecking Order Theory.  
Getzmann et al. (2014) analyze the speed of adjustment toward target capital structures 
for 1239 asian companies based on generalized method of moments estimations. His 
findings strong evidence that companies in Asia pursue target capital structures, as 
predicted by the Trade-Off Theory. He also shows that the convergence to target capital 
structures is consistent with international evidence, estimated at an annual adjustment 
speed of 24–45% of original leverage levels. 
Castro et al. (2015) examine the effect of a firm’s life cycle stages on the capital structure 
in tech versus non-tech firms using a wide sample of public companies from Europe. The 
authors used Dickinson’s (2011) approach to measure life cycle stages, classifying firms 
into five life stages (introduction, growth, mature, shake-out and decline) according to 
their cash flow patterns. Although this study aims to compare capital structures 
throughout the life cycle of technological companies with non-tech firms, this study 
concluded that there was evidence in the relationship between the capital structure and 
the life cycle. Additionally, through the test of Pecking Order Theory, the lower use of 
debt of technological companies throughout their life cycle was confirmed. 
Tian et al., 2015) use a panel data-fixed effect approach and data collected from Chinese 
public manufacturing firms between 1999 and 2011. They used Dickinson’s (2011) 
approach to classify companies into five life stages (introduction, growth, mature, shake-
out and decline) by cash flow patterns. They found that Chinese public manufacturing 
companies adjust their debt ratio at different speeds when they are in different life cycle 
stages. Specifically, the adjustment speed showed a U-shaped pattern over the life cycle, 
as follows: it is 68.52 (birth), 61.31 (growth), 26.91 (mature), 42.96 (revival) and 48.78 
(decline) percent, respectively. 
Ahsan et al. (2016) analyze, with a Fixed Effects Model, the adjustment rate made to 
target capital structures by a large amount of Pakistani listed non-financial firms with a 
sample period between 1972 and 2010. To classify firms into life cycle stages they chose 
the multivariate methodology (Anthony and Ramesh, 1992), using growth, mature and 
decline stages. They find a low-high-low leverage pattern during growth, maturity and 
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decline stages, in line with Trade-Off Theory. The study also observes different 
adjustment rates for the three stages, as follows: for growing firms, it was 47.9%, 49.3% 
and 37.9% for short-term leverage, long-term leverage and total leverage, respectively; 
for mature firms, it was 31.3%, 35.5% and 17.5% for short-term leverage, long-term 
leverage and total leverage, respectively; and for declining firms, it was 20.8%, 22.2% 
and 15.1% for short-term leverage, long-term leverage and total leverage, respectively. 
Similar to Ahsan et al. (2016), but with a generalized method of moments model,  Rehman 
et al. (2016) investigate how firms adjust their leverage policy across the firm’s life cycle 
but they use a sample of 867 listed Chinese non-financial firms over the period from 1996 
to 2014. For the effect, they followed Anthony and Ramesh (1992) and Ahsan et al. 
(2016), and categorized firms into three categories (growth, maturity and decline) and 
employed a dynamic panel data model to estimate adjustment rates in these three life 
stages. In addition, they also examined various multilevel determinants of leverage. The 
study finds a low-high-low pattern of leverage ratio across growth, maturity and decline 
stages for the Chinese firms, which enabled the conclusion that leverage policy is in 
accordance with the Trade-Off Theory. Moreover, the leverage adjustment rates vary for 
different life stages, as follows: for growing firms, it was 90.5%, 75.0% and 59.4% for 
short-term leverage, long-term leverage and total leverage, respectively; for mature firms, 
it was 78.0%, 43.5% and 28.6% for short-term leverage, long-term leverage and total 
leverage, respectively; and for declining firms, it was 64.0%, 54.1% and 26.8% for short-
term leverage, long-term leverage and total leverage, respectively. 
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3. Hypotheses Development 
Based on the theories and empirical evidences of previous studies, this chapter introduces 
our research hypotheses on firm leverage across its life cycle stages. 
(i) Pecking Order Theory 
According to recent studies (e.g. Ahsan et al., 2016; Rehman et al., 2016), in their earlier 
stages, firms have higher information asymmetry and lower profitability. In addition, 
growing firms usually improve their information gathering capability, but as their 
investment needs increase they do not retain or retain less earnings and they even raise 
more debt to face such needs. Regarding maturity stages, firms tend to have more retained 
earnings due to their lower investment needs and so they raise less debt than in growth 
stages. Consequently, mature companies tend to prefer equity financing and are also 
characterized to have less information asymmetry. As for decline stages, firms’ profits 
decrease as the retained earnings, which leads to bigger motives to raise debt again.  
Also Frielinghaus et al. (2005) and Teixeira and Santos (2006) observed that the Pecking 
Order Theory explains how firms tend to adopt specific financing strategies as they 
progress along their lives. The changes in the adverse selection costs and information 
asymmetry in the Pecking Order offer signs of a high-low-high general pattern in firms’ 
leverage.  
Hence, the Pecking Order Theory suggests a high-low-high financing pattern, since debt 
is high in growth stages, then reduces at maturity and rises again in decline stages. 
Therefore we hypothesize: 
 Hypothesis 1 (H1): There is a high-low-high pattern of leverage during firms’ 
life stages. 
 
(ii) Trade-Off Theory 
Nevertheless, the static form of the Trade-Off Theory postulates that a firm defines an 
optimal level of leverage based on a trade-off between the associated benefits and the cost 
with alternative financing (in perfect markets). Nevertheless, the capital structure of a 
company is also influenced by other types of factors (endogenous and exogenous), which 
vary over time and certainly with the life stages of companies. Consequently, companies 
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adjust their capital structure by making their decisions dynamic (Fischer et al., 1989). 
Moreover, regardless of the life stage in which they are, in order to benefit from larger 
tax advantages, companies are attracted to borrow higher debt. But with certain limits, 
since if firms increase its debt too much, it increases bankruptcy and financial distress 
risk. Therefore, companies feel the need to balance between tax benefits and costs of 
bankruptcy. Moreover, Ahsan et al. (2016) and Rehman et al. (2016), who concluded that 
that leverage policy in their studies is in accordance with trade-off theory, mentioned in 
their studies that it is expected that bankruptcy chances are higher in growth and decline 
stages than in mature ones, which leads companies to use less debt at these stages. 
Therefore, even knowing that higher debt would mean higher tax benefits, in these stages 
firms should raise less debt. 
So, it can be concluded that Trade-Off Theory suggests a low-high-low financing pattern 
as validated by Frielinghaus et al. (2005) and Teixeira and Santos (2006), since the use 
of debt is low in growth stages, then increases in maturity stages and reduces again in 
decline stages. Therefore we hypothesize: 
 Hypothesis 2 (H2): There is a low-high-low pattern of leverage during firms’ 
life stages. 
 
(iii) Agency Cost Theory 
According to Ahsan et al. (2016) and Rehman et al. (2016), it is in the growth stage that 
firms will face more investment opportunities, which will create a greater willingness on 
the part of managers to consume the available cash flows, however, at this life stage, 
companies have fewer free cash flows, which leads them to raise more debt. Then, at 
maturity stages, firms have higher free cash flows, but less investment opportunities and 
so firms raise less debt. Finally, when firms are in decline, they raise debt because it acts 
as a control mechanism. In this regard, Agency Cost Theory suggests a high-low-high 
financing patterns. Therefore we hypothesize: 
 Hypothesis 3 (H3): There is a high-low-high pattern of leverage during firms’ 
life stages. 
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(iv) Diamond’s Theory 
In agreement with Ahsan et al. (2016) and Rehman et al. (2016), we assume that firm’s 
reputation can generate a low-high-high financing patterns, since the use of debt is low 
in growth stages and is high in maturity and in decline stages. 
In fact, the findings of the Diamond (1989) conclude that reputation varies along firms’ 
life stages, which helps to realize that their financing decisions also vary accordingly. 
Naturally, firms in growth stages have less history or past record and so have low 
reputation, meaning a lower credit capacity and information asymmetry and consequent 
lower debt attractiveness. As for maturity and decline stages, firms already have a solid 
history and so a lower information asymmetry, consistent with an increase in reputation 
in these stages. Therefore, mature and declining companies as they have higher reputation 
raise more debt. Therefore we hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 4 (H4): There is a low-high-high pattern of leverage during firms’ 
life stages. 
 
Table 1: Leverage pattern across firm’s life cycle as suggested by capital structure 
Capital structure 
Theories 
Leverage pattern 
Growth Maturity Decline 
Pecking Order Theory High Low High 
Trade-Off Theory Low High Low 
Agency Cost Theory High Low High 
Diamond’s Theory Low High High 
Source: Ahsan et al. (2016) and Rehman et al. (2016) 
The table above, based on the previous hypotheses, summarizes the inputs of each theory 
when approaching the relationship between capital structure and life cycle stages. 
It should be yet noted that we exclude the Market Timing Theory, which was mentioned 
but not hypothesized in the studies of Ahsan et al. (2016) and Rehman et al. (2016), since 
it did not have its relationship with leverage defined in the table nor any hypothesis 
associated. 
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4. Data Description 
For the empirical analysis we choose a sample of firms listed in the Euronext Lisbon and 
in the Madrid Stock Exchange. From this initial sample, we excluded i) financial firms, 
due to their balance sheet being affected by specific factors, such as industry rules and 
regulatory laws, ii) firms whose financial year is different from the civil year, in 
accordance with a recent study applied for a portuguese sample (Borges, 2016). In 
addition, we decided to exclude also companies that did not have financial information 
regarding the three life cycle classification variables for a minimum consecutive period 
of 3 years, because of reasons of consistency in the sample. 
Initially, when the batch of companies was withdrawn from Thomson Reuters Eikon, we 
had 168 companies. After these adjustments, the sample is a panel of 117 firms over the 
period of 2001 to 2016. All data were taken from Thomson Reuters Eikon (database 
chosen for containing information at market value). 
Next, we proceed by describing the methodology used to classify the firms in their life 
cycle stages. After that, we present the dependent and independent variables and their 
descriptive statistics. 
4.1. Classification of firms in different life cycle stages 
Regarding the classification of firms into life stages, we follow the multivariate 
methodology developed by Anthony and Ramesh (1992), which was also used in the 
studies of Ahsan et al. (2016) and Rehman et al. (2016). As mentioned, this methodology 
divides firms into three life stages which are growth, maturity and decline. 
We choose a multivariate method, in accordance with Anthony and Ramesh (1992), over 
the univariate approach due to its higher reliability and given that its analysis avoid firm 
size effects, risk differences and measurement errors. In addition, there are various studies 
employing a multivariate procedure (Jenkins et al., 2004; Teixeira and Santos, 2006; 
Ahsan et al., 2016; Rehman et al., 2016). 
The main variables used in this research method are the dividend payout ratio (dividend 
paid/net profit before tax), sales growth (firm’s annual percentage change in revenues) 
and age (natural logarithm of number of years since a firm first traded). 
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The classification itself started by calculating the firms’ dividend payout ratios and sales 
growth for each year, and then we measured the median values of these variables based 
on prior five years data.  
Consequently, and describing the methodology applied, after calculating the 5-year 
median values of the variables abovementioned, we made three columns: age, 5-year 
median values of sales growth and 5-year median values of dividend payout ratio. Then, 
we made three thirds for the three variables. 
After that, we classified firms according to a criteria based on three life cycle stages, as 
presented in the table below. 
Table 2: Life cycle variables and classification method 
Life cycle stages Dividend payout (DP) Sales growth (SG) Age (AGE) 
Growth Low High Young 
Mature Medium Medium Adult 
Decline High Low Old 
Source: Rehman et al. (2016) and Ahsan et al. (2016) 
As showed: i) growing firms are characterized by lower dividend payout ratios, a high 
growth in sales and young age; ii) mature firms tend to increase their payout ratio and 
sales growth, as also age; and iii) declining firms present the highest payout ratios, 
become even more older, but reduce their growth in sales.  
Afterwards, each firm-year observation is allocated to a group and scored (growth=1; 
mature=2; decline=3). Subsequently, the scores given for all three variables are summed, 
which means that the minimum value is 3 and the maximum is 9. In accordance with the 
sums, we classify the summed up scores according to the following thresholds: 
 Firms in a growth stage: those which have a composite score lesser than or equal to 4 
(first two intervals). 
 Firms in a maturity stage: those which have a composite score between 5 and 7 
(middle three intervals). 
 Firms in a decline stage: those which have a composite score greater than or equal to 
8 (last two intervals). 
In the table below, we present the descriptive statistics of life cycle classification 
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variables. 
 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics of firm’s classification variables 
Variable Obs Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. 
Panel A: Growth 
Median DP 235 0.047 0.027 0.302 -0.656 0.146 
Median SG 235 -0.035 0.016 0.093 -1.875 0.185 
Age 235 0.708 0.845 1.146 0.000 0.386 
Panel B: Maturity 
Median DP 1029 0.221 0.238 5.878 -66.857 2.140 
Median SG 1029 0.058 0.055 0.974 -3.391 0.199 
Age 1029 0.995 1.146 1.415 0.000 0.396 
Panel C: Decline 
Median DP 124 0.304 0.272 1.327 0.131 0.161 
Median SG 124 0.146 0.140 0.305 0.095 0.043 
Age 124 1.214 1.230 1.362 0.903 0.105 
Note: Median DP is the median value of annual dividend paid over net profit before tax based on prior five-year data. 
Median SG is the median value of percentage change in annual sales based on prior five-year data; Age is natural 
logarithm of number of years since a firm is listed. 
The above table presents the descriptive statistics of the three variables used to classify 
firms into growth, mature and decline stages. It should be noted that the calculation of 
median values for dividend payout ratio and sales growth based on five years’ prior data, 
reduced our total number of firm-year observations from 1872 to 1388. As a result, Table 
3 indicates that we have 235 firm-year observations for the growth stage; 1029 firm-year 
observations for the maturity stage and 124 firm-year observations for the decline stage.  
4.2. Dependent Variable 
The purpose of this research is to study the effects of firms’ life cycle stages on their 
capital structure, thus the dependent variable will be the capital structure, or leverage. Its 
measurement is in accordance with financial leverage following the methodologies used 
in the empirical studies of Ahsan et al. (2016) and Rehman et al. (2016). Therefore, three 
proxies of leverage will be used, as follows: 
 Short-Term Leverage (SL) which is the ratio of short-term loan to total assets; 
 Long-Term Leverage (LT) that is the ratio of long-term loan to total assets; and 
 Total Leverage (TL) meaning the ratio of total liabilities to total assets.  
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4.3. Independent Variables 
Following very recent empirical studies (Ahsan et al., 2016; Rehman et al., 2016), we 
selected our explanatory variables and we shall now describe their proxies and 
relationship to capital structure. In addition, we will also describe their relationship to the 
leverage’s adjustment rate. 
Table 4: Summary table of control variables, their proxies and proposed relationship 
with leverage 
Variable Notation Measurement 
Relationship 
with 
leverage 
Relationship 
with 
adjustment 
rate 
Firm 
level 
Tax shield TS 
Ratio of debt paid 
and gross profit 
+ + 
Bankruptcy risk ZS Altman’s z score +/- + 
Business risk BR 
Annual change in 
net profit 
+/- +/- 
Non-debt tax 
shield 
NDTS 
Ratio of 
depreciation to 
total assets 
- ? 
Agency costs AgC 
Ratio of operating 
expense over sales 
+ ? 
Growth GROW 
Annual change in 
total assets 
+/- + 
Current 
profitability 
CP 
Net profit scaled 
by total assets 
+/- + 
Past profitability PP 
Retained earnings 
ratio 
+/- + 
Liquidity LIQ 
Ratio of current 
assets to current 
liabilities 
+/- + 
Tangibility TAN 
Ratio of net fixed 
assets to total 
assets 
+ ? 
Collateral value CV 
Ratio of gross 
fixed assets at cost 
to total assets  
+ ? 
Firm size SIZE 
Natural logarithm 
of firm’s assets 
+/- + 
Industry 
level 
Industry leverage ILEV 
Mean of industry 
leverage 
+ + 
Industry 
profitability 
IP 
Mean of industry 
profit 
? ? 
Country 
level 
Inflation rate INF 
Annual inflation 
rate based on 
consumer prices 
+ + 
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Variable Notation Measurement 
Relationship 
with 
leverage 
Relationship 
with 
adjustment 
rate 
Exchange rate ER 
Yearly exchange 
rate of eur to us 
dollar 
? + 
Economic growth EG 
Annual per  capita 
GDP rate 
+/- +/- 
Capital formation CF 
Ratio of gross 
capital formation 
to GDP 
? ? 
Life cycle stages  
Growth = 1; 
Mature = 2; 
Decline = 3 
  
 
It should be noted that in those studies it was showed that, based on Raian and Zingales 
(1995), Booth et al. (2001), and Jõeveer (2013) there are three categories of factors that 
clarify target leverage, which are firm, industry and macroeconomic factors. Also, these 
factors can also clarify adjustment rates toward target capital structure (Drobetza and 
Wanzenried, 2006; Tongkong, 2012; Getzmann et al., 2014). Our study will take into 
account this type of factors, on the basis of which managers of a firm set their target 
capital structure. 
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4.4. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 5: Descriptive Statistics of dependent and independent variables in the three life cycle stages 
 SL LL TL TS ZS BR NDTS AgC GROW CP PP LIQ TAN CV SIZE ISL ILL ITL IP INF ER EG CF 
Growth stage 
Obs 235 235 235 142 169 235 222 235 235 235 234 235 234 191 235 235 235 235 235 235 235 235 235 
Mean 0.018 0.268 0.741 0.046 1.512 -0.056 0.033 0.945 -0.047 0.026 0.014 1.274 0.262 0.234 9.009 0.018 0.238 0.731 0.050 1.960 1.273 0.445 0.018 
Median 0.000 0.251 0.718 0.036 1.297 0.143 0.030 0.926 0.001 0.025 0.068 1.038 0.227 0.060 8.901 0.016 0.233 0.680 0.030 2.446 1.458 1.370 0.000 
Max 0.464 0.916 1.740 1.745 7.612 88.707 0.192 2.999 0.656 0.980 0.652 9.665 0.853 1.280 10.996 0.085 0.546 1.114 0.633 4.395 0.890 3.278 0.464 
Min 0.000 0.000 0.065 -1.621 -2.683 -74.958 0.000 0.097 -1.678 -0.392 -1.625 0.094 0.001 0.000 7.379 0.000 0.020 0.522 -0.156 -0.836 0.137 -4.424 0.000 
Std. 
Dev. 
0.055 0.171 0.217 0.252 1.477 8.775 0.025 0.256 0.268 0.101 0.321 1.117 0.217 0.320 0.764 0.016 0.062 0.119 0.105 1.495 1.273 2.078 0.055 
Mature stage 
Obs 1025 1026 1026 711 918 1026 1001 1026 1026 1026 1018 1026 1026 945 1026 1029 1029 1029 1029 1029 1029 1029 1029 
Mean 0.020 0.237 0.740 0.076 3.026 0.319 0.038 0.875 -0.024 0.059 0.051 1.532 0.296 0.435 9.201 0.020 0.240 0.240 0.052 1.802 1.268 0.321 -1.315 
Median 0.000 0.231 0.707 0.031 1.428 0.074 0.033 0.912 0.022 0.037 0.140 1.117 0.272 0.245 9.133 0.016 0.233 0.233 0.030 2.356 1.319 1.338 -0.016 
Max 0.579 0.863 21.169 10.015 717.345 460.022 0.255 10.826 0.974 27.276 4.680 58.682 0.920 3.869 11.126 0.222 0.546 0.546 0.633 4.395 1.458 3.282 7.757 
Min 0.000 0.000 0.012 -0.715 -90.992 
-
130.737 
0.000 -18.834 -40.928 -2.244 -50.030 0.035 -0.613 0.000 6.397 0.000 0.036 0.036 -0.356 -0.836 0.890 -4.424 -18.107 
Std. 
Dev. 
0.061 0.160 0.853 0.434 29.407 16.401 0.030 1.065 1.329 0.860 2.142 3.487 0.220 0.481 0.857 0.024 0.067 0.067 0.121 1.590 0.140 2.206 7.372 
Decline stages 
Obs 124 124 124 93 122 124 123 124 124 124 123 124 124 109 124 124 124 124 124 124 124 124 124 
Mean 0.019 0.236 0.730 0.048 1.735 0.192 0.031 0.898 0.052 0.048 0.160 1.053 0.333 0.510 9.710 0.016 0.250 0.743 0.038 2.115 1.343 -0.484 -3.332 
Median 0.000 0.223 0.744 0.038 1.375 0.037 0.031 0.914 0.056 0.050 0.152 1.072 0.273 0.446 9.630 0.013 0.236 0.713 0.040 2.595 1.337 -0.446 -3.761 
Max 0.540 0.604 0.935 0.181 9.358 23.958 0.161 1.477 0.585 0.165 0.557 2.371 0.908 1.370 10.987 0.221 0.392 1.114 0.633 4.076 1.458 3.278 7.757 
Min 0.000 0.000 0.203 0.001 0.373 -2.835 0.005 0.514 -0.878 -0.153 -0.531 0.304 0.017 0.003 8.335 0.000 0.108 0.571 -0.156 -0.836 1.050 -4.424 -18.107 
Std. 
Dev. 
0.061 0.152 0.131 0.044 1.128 2.352 0.020 0.119 0.204 0.049 0.157 0.386 0.215 0.368 0.720 0.022 0.060 0.101 0.063 1.493 0.095 2.333 8.273 
Note: The above table presents the descriptive statistics of dependent and independent variables used in this study during growth, mature and decline stages. ISLj,t is the mean industry short-term 
leverage; ILLj,t is mean industry long-term leverage; ITLj,t is mean industry total leverage. The remaining variables were descripted above (in sections 4.2 and 4.3). 
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Table 5 shows the summary statistics we computed for the variables used in our analysis. 
The mean values of SL and LL enable us to conclude that Portuguese companies opt for 
long-term leverage rather than short-term leverage. TL has the highest mean variable out 
of the three variables and it have its highest value in growth stage. It is also noted that on 
what concerns LL and TL, as companies evolve from life stage they tend to decrease their 
leverage, with the exception of SL.  
The mean value for SL is 0.018 during growth, 0.020 during maturity and 0.019 during 
decline stage, which means a low-high-low pattern of total leverage (TL), being in line 
with the Trade-Off Theory of capital structure, confirmiming the hypothesis 2.  
The mean value for LL is 0.268 during growth, 0.237 during maturity and 0.236 during 
decline stage, which means a high-low-low pattern of total leverage (TL), which does not 
correspond to any theory of capital structure, rejecting all of our hypothesis.  
The mean value for TL is 0.741 during growth, 0.740 during maturity and 0.730 during 
decline stage, which means a high-low-low pattern of total leverage (TL), which does not 
correspond to any theory of capital structure, rejecting all of our hypothesis. 
The mean values of PP, TAN, CV, SIZE increase along the three phases. The mean value 
for AgC is higher during growth stage (0.945). In the opposite direction, GROW present 
its highest mean value in the decline stages (0.052). As for the variables TS, ZS, BR, 
NDTS, LIQ and CP, their mean value presents a low-high-low pattern, which is in line 
with the Trade-Off Theory of the capital structure. 
The ISL means (0.018 during the growth stage, 0.020 during the mature stage and 0.016 
during the decline stage) and the ILL ones (0.238 during the growth stage, 0.240 during 
the mature stage and 0.250 during the decline stage) also suggest that Portuguese firms 
rely heavily on long-term debt throughout their life cycles as their main financing way 
indicate. The ITL means (0.731 during the growth stage, 0.240 during the mature stage 
and 0.743 during the decline stage) suggest a low-high-low pattern consistent with the 
Pecking Order Theory and with Agency Cost Theory.  
The variables INF and ER appear to influence the leverage negatively, since when they 
reach the highest values (decline stages), leverage reaches the lowest. In the opposite 
direction are the variables EG and CF that present higher values in the growth stage, 
similar to leverage.
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5. Empirical model 
The objective of our study is to analyze the effects of capital structure determinants’ 
across three life cycle stages and to find out the variations in the leverage adjustment rate 
during those life-cycle stages. Accordingly, we used a sample of 117 Iberian non-
financial listed firms in the 2001-2016 period using panel data methodology. 
According to Wooldridge (2015), the panel data method is used when data has cross-
sectional and time series dimensions, thus, when it can be observed that the behaviour of 
individuals vary across time. One of the great advantages of this method is that panel 
datasets allow not only for the observation of the variables’ behaviour over time, but also 
for the control of omitted variables. 
Nevertheless, there are various methods dealing with panel data and the most used are 
Pooled OLS, the Fixed Effects and the Random Effects Models. We will test each one 
and decide on which is the most suitable to apply in our model.  
Our baseline model to determine leverage ratios (short-term leverage, long-term leverage  
and total leverage) explained by its determinants, was based on recent similar studies 
(Ahsan, 2016; Rehman et al., 2016), as follows: 
𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑍𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐵𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑁𝐷𝑇𝑆𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽5𝐴𝑔𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐶𝑃𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽8𝑃𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽10𝑇𝐴𝑁𝑖,𝑡+𝛽11𝐶𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽12𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽13𝐼𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽14𝐼𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽15𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽16𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽17𝐸𝐺𝑡  + 𝛽18𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝜇𝑖,𝑡                                                                                                                           (5.1) 
Where LEV is one of the three measures of leverage (i.e. short-term leverage - SLi,t -, 
long-term leverage – LLi,t - and total leverage - TLi,t) - for the ith firm at time t, 𝛽0 is 
constant term. Furthermore, TSi,t is the ratio of tax payments over gross profit; ZSi,t is 
Altman’s Z-score. BRi,t represents business risk of a firm i at time t. NDTSi,t is non-debt 
tax shield of a firm i at time t. AgCi,t represents agency costs of a firm i at time t. GROWi,t 
is the annual growth rate of a firm i at time t. CPi,t represents current profit of a firm i at 
time t while PPi,t is past profits of a firm i at time t. LIQi,t represents liquidity of a firm i 
at time t. TANi,t represents the tangibility ratio of a firm i at time t. CVi,t is the ratio of 
fixed assets at cost over total assets SIZEi,t is the firm i’s size at time t. ILEV𝑖,𝑡 is one of 
the three measures of industry leverage (i.e. industry short-term leverage - ISLi,t -, 
industry long-term leverage - ITLi,t - and industry total leverage – ITLi,t - for the ith firm 
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at time t. IPj,t is the industry mean profit of an industry j at time t. INFt represents inflation 
rate at time t. ERt is exchange rate at time t. EGt represents economic growth at time t. 
CFt is capital formation ratio to total GDP at time t. 𝜇it is the error component for ith firm 
at time t. 
Based on the references of Fischer et al. (1989) and Myers (1984), Tian et al. (2015), 
Rehman et al. (2016), Ahsan et al. (2016) suggested that firms continuously strive toward 
their dynamic optimal target leverage, but at the same time, adjustment costs deviate the 
firms away from their target leverage and slow down their adjustment rates. 
Consequently, firms may adjust their actual leverage partially toward the target leverage. 
As so, if these costs were absent, firms would adjust their capital structure immediately, 
but if they are infinitely no adjustment would be noted (Brunaldi et al., 2015). Therefore, 
in order to estimate the rate of adjustment of leverage, we applied another equation: 
𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 = 𝛾(𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡
∗  
 
− 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1)                                                                                       (5.2) 
What is the same as: 
𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 = (1 − 𝛾)𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡
∗                                                                                                    (5.3) 
where 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡
∗  is the target leverage, If 𝛾 = 1; means full adjustment has been achieved by 
the firm within one accounting period.  
It is important to mention that 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡
∗  is a vector variable (one that is not observed but 
whose value is calculated from other variables). Accordingly, we assume that managers 
of a firm set their target capital structure a year before, which leads 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡
∗  to be measured 
by one year lag of determinants of capital structure (mentioned in the first equation 
above). 
The leverage adjustment rate depends on the adjustment cost, which itself depends on the 
determinants of the target capital structure of a firm. Thus, by replacing this rationale in 
equation 5.1, we get the following equation: 
𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0𝛾 + (1 − 𝛾)𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝛽1𝑇𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝛽2𝑍𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝛽3𝐵𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝛽4𝑁𝐷𝑇𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛾𝛽5𝐴𝑔𝐶𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝛽6𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝛽7𝐶𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝛽8𝑃𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝛽9𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛾𝛽10𝑇𝐴𝑁𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝛽11𝐶𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝛽12𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝛽13𝐼𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛾𝛽14𝐼𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝛽15𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝛽16𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝛽17𝐸𝐺𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝛽18𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝜇𝑖,𝑡  
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Where 𝛾 is a partial adjustment parameter; (1 – 𝛾)  is the adjustment rate. Hence, 1 - 
coefficient of LEVi,t-1 is the leverage adjustment rate.  
Moreover, in order to determine the adjustment rate during different life-cycle stages, and 
as advised by Ahsan, we created a categorical value (growth=1; maturity=2; decline=3) 
and estimated equation 5.4 across the three firm life cycle stages. 
This last equation is the one we use to test our econometric model and our hypotheses 
(described in chapter 3) to be applied in the section 5.2 considering the leverage 
adjustment rate and the firm life cycle stages.  
To estimate the leverage adjustment rate, Getzmann et al. (2014) and Rehman et al. (2016) 
used GMM’s method. However, we followed Ahsan et al. (2016) and, hence, we 
estimated equation 5.4, using a Fixed Effects Model.
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5.1. Correlation matrix and VIF test 
Table 6: Correlation matrix and VIF test for short-term leverage 
 TS i,t-1 ZS i,t-1 BR i,t-1 NDTS i,t-1 AgC i,t-1 GROW i,t-1 CP i,t-1 PP i,t-1 LIQ i,t-1 TAN i,t-1 SIZE i,t-1 CV i,t-1 ISL i,t-1 IP i,t-1 INF i,t-1 ER i,t-1 EG i,t-1 CF i,t-1 VIF 
TSi,t-1 1                  1.071 
ZS i,t-1 -0.038 1                 17.384 
BR i,t-1 0.014 0.029 1                1.015 
NDTS i,t-1 -0.081 -0.221 -0.058 1               1.690 
AGC i,t-1 0.297 -0.143 0.014 -0.089 1              1.172 
GROW i,t-1 -0.014 0.731 0.006 -0.302 -0.139 1             41.427 
CP i,t-1 -0.014 -0.358 -0.002 0.200 -0.013 0.028 1            13.021 
PP i,t-1 -0.010 0.964 0.034 -0.300 -0.112 0.745 -0.396 1           83.214 
LIQ i,t-1 -0.018 0.060 0.028 -0.101 -0.003 0.034 -0.017 0.047 1          1.055 
TAN i,t-1 -0.083 0.023 -0.020 0.343 -0.135 0.009 -0.024 0.052 -0.083 1         2.525 
CV i,t-1 -0.082 -0.263 -0.037 0.381 -0.034 -0.285 0.095 -0.293 -0.050 0.662 1        2.574 
SIZE i,t-1 -0.002 0.106 -0.012 -0.055 -0.172 0.127 -0.122 0.194 -0.139 0.060 -0.093 1       1.288 
ISL i,t-1 -0.026 0.057 -0.006 0.210 -0.027 0.002 -0.011 0.018 -0.004 -0.042 0.014 -0.055 1      1.258 
IP i,t-1 -0.033 -0.035 -0.002 0.086 -0.042 0.006 0.192 -0.065 0.027 0.072 0.160 -0.092 -0.066 1     1.272 
INF i,t-1 0.046 0.100 0.052 0.012 -0.050 0.052 -0.041 0.067 -0.068 0.040 -0.044 0.026 0.023 -0.200 1    1.269 
ER i,t-1 0.007 0.045 -0.023 -0.047 -0.002 -0.014 -0.036 0.040 -0.025 -0.056 -0.042 -0.001 0.190 -0.177 0.144 1   1.498 
EG i,t-1 0.019 -0.008 0.020 0.011 -0.123 0.050 0.046 -0.021 0.042 0.013 0.013 0.030 -0.147 0.254 0.150 -0.495 1  22.561 
CF i,t-1 0.027 -0.005 0.032 0.004 -0.119 0.044 0.052 -0.020 0.049 0.013 0.050 0.041 -0.145 0.285 0.166 -0.448 0.973 1 22.238 
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Table 7: Correlation matrix and VIF test for long-term leverage 
 TS i,t-1 ZS i,t-1 BR i,t-1 NDTS i,t-1 AgC i,t-1 GROW i,t-1 CP i,t-1 PP i,t-1 LIQ i,t-1 TAN i,t-1 SIZE i,t-1 CV i,t-1 ISL i,t-1 IP i,t-1 INF i,t-1 ER i,t-1 EG i,t-1 CF i,t-1 VIF 
TSi,t-1 1                  1.074 
ZS i,t-1 -0.038 1                 18.536 
BR i,t-1 0.014 0.029 1                1.016 
NDTS i,t-1 -0.081 -0.221 -0.058 1               1.569 
AGC i,t-1 0.297 -0.143 0.014 -0.089 1              1.182 
GROW i,t-1 -0.014 0.731 0.006 -0.302 -0.139 1             41.968 
CP i,t-1 -0.014 -0.358 -0.002 0.200 -0.013 0.028 1            13.252 
PP i,t-1 -0.010 0.964 0.034 -0.300 -0.112 0.745 -0.396 1           83.072 
LIQ i,t-1 -0.018 0.060 0.028 -0.101 -0.003 0.034 -0.017 0.047 1          1.082 
TAN i,t-1 -0.083 0.023 -0.020 0.343 -0.135 0.009 -0.024 0.052 -0.083 1         2.561 
CV i,t-1 -0.082 -0.263 -0.037 0.381 -0.034 -0.285 0.095 -0.293 -0.050 0.662 1        2.594 
SIZE i,t-1 -0.002 0.106 -0.012 -0.055 -0.172 0.127 -0.122 0.194 -0.139 0.060 -0.093 1       1.420 
ISL i,t-1 0.067 -0.071 -0.054 -0.060 0.023 -0.015 -0.022 -0.012 0.115 -0.085 -0.109 0.138 1      1.345 
IP i,t-1 -0.033 -0.035 -0.002 0.086 -0.042 0.006 0.192 -0.065 0.027 0.072 0.160 -0.092 -0.131 1     1.281 
INF i,t-1 0.046 0.100 0.052 0.012 -0.050 0.052 -0.041 0.067 -0.068 0.040 -0.044 0.026 -0.160 -0.200 1    1.298 
ER i,t-1 0.007 0.045 -0.023 -0.047 -0.002 -0.014 -0.036 0.040 -0.025 -0.056 -0.042 -0.001 0.134 -0.177 0.144 1   1.485 
EG i,t-1 0.019 -0.008 0.020 0.011 -0.123 0.050 0.046 -0.021 0.042 0.013 0.013 0.030 -0.155 0.254 0.150 -0.495 1  22.543 
CF i,t-1 0.027 -0.005 0.032 0.004 -0.119 0.044 0.052 -0.020 0.049 0.013 0.050 0.041 -0.167 0.285 0.166 -0.448 0.973 1 22.171 
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Table 8: Correlation matrix and VIF test for total leverage 
Correlation TS i,t-1 ZS i,t-1 BR i,t-1 NDTS i,t-1 AgC i,t-1 GROW i,t-1 CP i,t-1 PP i,t-1 LIQ i,t-1 TAN i,t-1 SIZE i,t-1 CV i,t-1 ISL i,t-1 IP i,t-1 INF i,t-1 ER i,t-1 EG i,t-1 CF i,t-1 VIF 
TSi,t-1 1                  1.073 
ZS i,t-1 -0.038 1                 20.778 
BR i,t-1 0.014 0.029 1                1.022 
NDTS i,t-1 -0.081 -0.221 -0.058 1               1.583 
AgC i,t-1 0.297 -0.143 0.014 -0.089 1              1.178 
GROW i,t-1 -0.014 0.731 0.006 -0.302 -0.139 1             41.544 
CP i,t-1 -0.014 -0.358 -0.002 0.200 -0.013 0.028 1            13.287 
PP i,t-1 -0.010 0.964 0.034 -0.300 -0.112 0.745 -0.396 1           136.600 
LIQ i,t-1 -0.018 0.060 0.028 -0.101 -0.003 0.034 -0.017 0.047 1          1.064 
TAN i,t-1 -0.083 0.023 -0.020 0.343 -0.135 0.009 -0.024 0.052 -0.083 1         2.535 
CV i,t-1 -0.082 -0.263 -0.037 0.381 -0.034 -0.285 0.095 -0.293 -0.050 0.662 1        2.562 
SIZE i,t-1 -0.002 0.106 -0.012 -0.055 -0.172 0.127 -0.122 0.194 -0.139 0.060 -0.093 1       1.386 
ISL i,t-1 0.072 -0.185 -0.042 -0.161 0.154 -0.132 0.026 -0.146 0.033 -0.168 -0.024 0.028 1      1.259 
IP i,t-1 -0.033 -0.035 -0.002 0.086 -0.042 0.006 0.192 -0.065 0.027 0.072 0.160 -0.092 0.156 1     1.293 
INF i,t-1 0.046 0.100 0.052 0.012 -0.050 0.052 -0.041 0.067 -0.068 0.040 -0.044 0.026 -0.296 -0.200 1    1.337 
ER i,t-1 0.007 0.045 -0.023 -0.047 -0.002 -0.014 -0.036 0.040 -0.025 -0.056 -0.042 -0.001 -0.079 -0.177 0.144 1   1.465 
EG i,t-1 0.019 -0.008 0.020 0.011 -0.123 0.050 0.046 -0.021 0.042 0.013 0.013 0.030 -0.003 0.254 0.150 -0.495 1  22.616 
CF i,t-1 0.027 -0.005 0.032 0.004 -0.119 0.044 0.052 -0.020 0.049 0.013 0.050 0.041 0.012 0.285 0.166 -0.448 0.973 1 22.233 
Note: All variables are lagged.  
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Tables 6-8 present the correlation matrices and VIF test for short-term, long-term and 
total leverage.  
Before empirically testing our models, we decided to carry out a correlation analysis for 
our explanatory variables according to the three proxies for leverage (short-term leverage, 
long-term leverage and total leverage) and also a multi-collinearity analysis to ensure that 
our data did not face any multi-collinearity issues. 
In what concerns the correlation results, it should be noted that the signs presented in the 
tables above should only be considered as preliminary results, since they are just 
considering the impact of one variable at each time in the leverage. 
However, looking at the results presented, and considering as high correlations the ones 
which present a value higher than 0.5, we will be more careful when analysing them in 
the estimation outputs, because they can induce to lower significance levels. 
Hence, we highlight strong correlations in the three proxies for leverage among ZS and 
GROW, ZS and PP, GROW and PP, TAN and CV and EG and CF. 
Complementing this analysis, we found variables that had a VIF greater than 10 which 
we decided, in accordance with Ahsan et al. (2016), to exclude them from our analysis. 
Hence, we excluded ZS, GROW, CP, PP, EG and CF from our model. For the other 
variables, as showed in the tables, there were not any multi-collinearity problem. 
Moreover, we did the VIF test for the three proxies for leverage and for the three life 
cycle stages (total of 9 models) and the results lead us to exclude two more variables. 
Specifically, the test made for the three proxies for leverage in the decline stage showed 
a VIF greater than 10 for the variables CV and TAN, which were then removed from the 
equations tested in that stage. 
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5.2. Empirical Results and analysis 
The present section addresses the results of the estimated regressions, with which we 
analyze the adjustment rate for all the three proxies for leverage during all three life cycle 
stages. We will also approach the relation with the explanatory variables of our model.  
The first step is to define which of the panel data methods is the most suitable for our 
model (using equation 5.4). Hence, we did the F-test and the Hausman test.   
Table 9: F-test and Hausman Test 
Equation F-test 
Level of 
confidence 
Hausman 
test 
Short-term leverage (SLi,t) in growth stage 7.453 99.9% 84.295*** 
Long-term leverage (LLi,t) in growth stage 2.453 99.9% 49.627*** 
Total leverage (TLi,t) in growth stage 0.943 - 11.090 
    
Short-term leverage (SLi,t) in maturity stage 1.636 99.9% 74.154*** 
Long-term leverage (LLi,t) in maturity stage 1.928 99.9% 120.417*** 
Total leverage (TLi,t) in maturity stage 2.036 99.9% 141.626*** 
    
Short-term leverage (SLi,t) in decline stage 1.954 - 38.014*** 
Long-term leverage (LLi,t) in decline stage 3.795 99.9% 78.210*** 
Total leverage (TLi,t) in decline stage 3.278 99.9% 37.471*** 
As so, we started with an F-test to decide among Fixed Effects and Pooled OLS, to see 
whether the observed and unobserved Fixed Effects are equal to zero. Firstly, we 
calculated the the F-critical for all proxies for leverage for all three life stages. In 
accordance with table 9, only the equations that regressed total leverage in growth stage 
and short-term leverage in decline stage did not reject the null hypothesis. The remaining 
equations rejected the null hypothesis, showing that pooled OLS is not the most 
appropriate model.  
After that, we carried out the Hausman specification test to decide between Fixed Effects 
and Random Effects. From table 9, we conclude that the p-values were significant for all 
models with exception for total leverage in growth stage, leading us to reject the null 
hypothesis (which states that no correlation exists between the unique companies errors 
and the regressors in the model) for eight equations and concluding that Fixed Effects 
was the most indicated method.  
Consequently, and according to the results presented above, we will use the Fixed Effects 
Model for all equations for consistency purposes. 
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Table 10: Estimation output of equation (4.3) during different life cycle stages 
 SL LL TL 
 Growth Maturity Decline Growth Maturity Decline Growth Maturity Decline 
Adjustment 
rate (%) 
0.739 0.542 n.a. 0.722 0.517 n.a. 0.299 0.303 0.716 
constant 0.039  0.079  -1.390  -0.467  -0.147  -0.957 * -0.981  5.873  0.757 * 
(0.106)  (0.116)  (0.987)  (1.16)  (0.194)  (0.538)  (1.986)  (3.857)  (0.428)  
LEVi,t-1 0.261  0.458 *** -0.329  0.278 * 0.483 *** -0.203  0.701 * 0.697 *** 0.284 * 
(0.219)  (0.112)  (0.601)  (0.164)  (0.069)  (0.150)  (0.385)  (0.148)  (0.144)  
TSi,t-1 -0.001  -0.005  0.015  -0.004  0.027 * 0.159  -0.009  -0.009  0.128  
(0.000)  (0.007)  (0.131)  (0.005)  (0.016)  (0.239)  (0.006)  (0.043)  (0.087)  
BR i,t-1 0.000  0.000  0.007  -0.001  0.000  0.003  0.001  0.000  0.003  
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.008)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.008)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.006)  
NDTS i,t-1 0.126  -0.047  1.185  -3.416  -0.097  -3.674  -0.574  2.617  -0.823  
(0.139)  (0.215)  (1.922)  (2.458)  (0.295)  (2.362)  (4.433)  (1.731)  (0.946)  
AgC i,t-1 0.000  0.001  0.759 ** 0.075 * 0.045 *** 0.370  0.120 * 0.033  0.047  
(0.003)  (0.004)  (0.343)  (0.042)  (0.016)  (0.242)  (0.060)  (0.037)  (0.218)  
LIQ i,t-1 0.002  0.000  0.000  0.004  0.004 ** 0.094 * 0.006  0.003  0.010  
(0.002)  (0.000)  (0.029)  (0.020)  (0.002)  (0.052)  (0.023)  (0.003)  (0.036)  
TAN i,t-1 0.017  -0.023  -  0.379  0.094  -  -0.054  0.450  -  
(0.018)  (0.025)  -  (0.236)  (0.088)  -  (0.347)  (0.302)  -  
CV i,t-1 -0.008  0.001  -  -0.449 *** -0.049  -  -0.194  -0.976  -  
(0.016)  (0.01)  -  (0.085)  (0.039)  -  (0.117)  (0.610)  -  
SIZE i,t-1 -0.007  -0.008  0.068  0.007  0.032  0.134 ** 0.149  -0.594  -0.019  
(0.012)  (0.011)  (0.067)  (0.126)  (0.022)  (0.053)  (0.223)  (0.404)  (0.035)  
ILEV i,t-1 -0.126  0.186  0.636  0.949 ** -0.092  -0.344  -0.165  0.119  -0.013  
(0.12)  (0.133)  (0.807)  (0.426)  (0.133)  (0.352)  (0.204)  (0.105)  (0.081)  
IP i,t-1 0.031 *** -0.002  -0.037  0.079  0.039 *** -0.025  -0.077  0.288 *** -0.034  
(0.008)  (0.007)  (0.049)  (0.053)  (0.012)  (0.063)  (0.101)  (0.051)  (0.043)  
INF i,t-1 0.001  0.001  -0.001  0.015  0.002  0.007 ** -0.001  -0.015  -0.001  
(0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.013)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.009)  (0.013)  (0.003)  
ER i,t-1 0.017  0.006  0.040  0.287 *** -0.035 * -0.238 * -0.063  -0.059  -0.057  
(0.014)  (0.018)  (0.060)  (0.124)  (0.019)  (0.136)  (0.136)  (0.111)  (0.091)  
R-squared 0.983  0.636  0.802  0.882  0.789  0.909  0.866  0.887  0.959  
Adjusted R-
squared 
0.966  0.559  0.673  0.765  0.745  0.850  0.732  0.864  0.932  
Obs 91  589  87  91  589  87  91  589  87  
F-statistic 58.475 *** 8.311 *** 6.212 *** 7.502 *** 17.841 *** 15.336 *** 6.449 *** 37.532 *** 35.489  
.
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Table 10 presents the estimates of the parameters in nine equations (for the three life cycle 
stages: growth, maturity and decline) for all the three dependent variables with Fixed 
Effects with the one year lagged explanatory variables.  
These models include control variables that are constant among companies but that evolve 
over time and that capture the influence of aggregate time-series trends. It should also be 
noted that we regress our empirical model with Fixed Effects using white’s standard 
errors clustered by firm robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation within the 
cluster. 
The model presented 91 observations in the growth stage, 589 in the maturity stage and 
91 in the decline stage. Our models for SL, LL and TL explained between 62%-98%, 
79%-88% and 86%-96% respectively of the leverage variations across the three life cycle 
stages. 
The low number of observations presented in the growth and decline stages lead to the 
low statistical significance observed in the models. However, for the equations regressed 
for maturity stages, the level of significance increased. 
Additionally, the p-values of the global significance test of the models validate the high 
reliability and the accuracy of the independent variables in explaining the dependent 
variable.  
5.2.1. Leverage adjustment rates 
The coefficients of the lagged total leverage for all three stages were statistically 
significant, indicating the existence of target leverage for non-financial Iberian listed 
companies during their growth, maturity and decline stages. The results presented for 
total leverage suggest that Iberian firms partially adjust their target total leverages and try 
to bring their actual leverage closer to the target leverage they have defined. However for 
the other two proxies for leverage (SL and LL), not all the estimated coefficients were 
statistically significant. 
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For the lagged long-term leverage, firms in decline stages are going away from their target 
long-term leverage, as it was not possible to found a leverage adjustment rate as indicated 
by Ahsan. The same occurred with the lagged short-term leverage, for which firms in 
decline stages are also not following a target short-term leverage. These results were not 
in accordance with prior literature. One possible explanation for the nonexistence of 
leverage adjustment rates in decline stages for short-term and long-term leverages, but 
existing for total leverage, might be the fact that companies in decline stages are adjusting 
their capital structure focusing more in the medium term debt, which data is only being 
considered in the total leverage. 
Furthermore, in what regards the growth and mature stages (for short- and long-term 
proxies for leverage), companies follow a target capital structure. In this sense, the 
adjustment rates for short-term leverage were 74% (growth) and 54% (maturity), while 
for long-term leverage were 72% (growth) and 52% (maturity). 
Growing firms presented an adjustment rate of 74%, 72% and 30% for SL, LL and TL 
respectively. For mature firms, the adjustment rate was 54%, 52% and 30%. However, 
the negative coefficient estimated for lagged SL and lagged LL in the decline stages 
indicates that in decline stage firms do not have a target leverage, as already explained 
above. 
For the short-term leverage and long-term leverage, growing firms have the highest 
adjustment rates, what can be explained by the fact that companies in their earlier stages 
need more financing to face their needs and investment opportunities. This is in 
accordance with the studies of Ahsan et al. (2016) and Rehman et al. (2016). 
As for total leverage, decline firms present the highest adjustment rates, while growing 
firms have the lowest adjustment rates, probably reflecting that more experienced 
companies have a greater ability to change their capital structure and adapt to market 
trends. 
5.2.2. Capital structure’s determinants 
CV and TAN were then excluded from the equations estimated only for decline stages 
due to their high VIF (higher than 10), so in decline stages these variables were not 
included. 
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BR, NDTS and TAN had no statistical significance in any of the models, reason why they 
were not target of a specific analysis 
In line with TOT, we found a positive relationship between TS and long-term leverage in 
maturity stages. This suggests that mature firms should raise more debt to increase tax 
shield benefits. 
Also in line with TOT, but without any statistical significance, BR showed a positive 
relationship with all the three proxies for leverage in the three life stages, with exception 
for the long-term leverage in the growth stage.  
The results for the AgC variable were consistent with our expectations, being statistically 
significant and positive in equations for SL in the decline stage, for LL in the growth and 
maturity stages and for TL in the growth stage. It induces that firms try to reduce their 
agency conflicts by raising debt and so reducing the available free cash flows to discipline 
the spending behavior of managers as mentioned in the Trade-off Theory. 
The variable LIQ, for which positive and negative signals were expected, showed only 
positive signals and these were statistically significant in the equations for LL in the 
maturity and decline stages. Consistent with the Pecking Order Theory, we identify a 
positive relationship with liquidity along all life stages. 
Unlike expected, the variable CV presented as its only statistically significant coefficient 
a negative sign (for long-term leverage in the growth stages). 
The variable SIZE presents, as expected in table 4, positive and negative signals, but the 
only statistically significant coefficient that presents is positive and is observed in the 
equation of LL in the decline stage. It may suggest that older/experienced decline firms 
adjust quickly toward their leverage targets. Consistent with the Trade-Off Theory, we 
identify: a positive relationship between size and long-term leverage during growth, 
mature and decline stages. 
As expected, the ILEV variable presented a statistically significant positive sign with the 
long-term leverage in the growth stage.  
The IP variable presented statistically significant positive signs for SL in the growth stage, 
LL in the maturity stage and TL in the maturity stage. 
  
 
35 
 
The relationship with INF showed a positive and statistically significant sign with 
leverage, especially with long-term leverage in the declining stage, explaining that higher 
inflation rates help those firms to adjust the book values of their leverage ratios and 
consequently increase their adjustment rates. As Portugal’s and Spain’s inflation rises, 
companies raise higher debt. 
Our ER showed ambiguously a statistically significant positive signal with LL in the 
growth stage and negative with long-term leverage in the maturity and decline stage. 
These negative signs for mature and declining firms suggest that unfavorable exchange 
rates increase the cost of debt and therefore slow down the adjustment rates of these 
companies.  
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6. Conclusion 
Our study investigated 15 years (2001-2016) using panel data to conclude on the 
adjustment rates for non-financial Iberian listed firms across three life cycle stages 
(growth, maturity and decline). 
Using the Anthony and Ramesh (1992) methodology to classify firms into life cycle 
stages, we estimated equations for three proxies of leverage (our dependent variables): 
short-term leverage, long-term leverage and total leverage. We estimated nine equations 
with Fixed Effects considering three dependent variables and three life stages.  
We found that during one accounting year, growing non-financial Iberian firms try to 
close their real leverages to their target leverages by 74%, 72% and 30% for short-term, 
long-term and total leverage, respectively. Mature firms did it by 54%, 52% and 30% for 
short-term, long-term and total leverage, respectively. In what concerns declining firms, 
we concluded that, with the exception for total leverage which presented a high 
adjustment rate of 72%, firms in decline stages are going away from their target leverages. 
Moreover, we also found that for short-term and long-term leverage, growing firms have 
the highest leverage adjustment rates, suggesting that growing firms, having more 
investment opportunities, quickly adjust their short- and long-term debt to the response 
to them. 
Conversely, for total leverage they are declining firms that have the highest rate of 
adjustment, indicating that declining companies have greater ease in adjusting their total 
capital structure, which includes not only short- and long-term debt, but also medium-
term and other liabilities. 
Furthermore, we found a low-high-low short-term capital structure pattern consistent with 
the Trade-Off Theory (hypothesis 2), consistent with the studies of Getzmann et al. 
(2014), Ahsan et al. (2016) and Rehman et al. (2016). For the remaining proxies for 
leverage (long-term and total), the patterns found were high-low-low, not consistent with 
any of our hypotheses. 
It should also be highlighted that our results contribute to the finance literature and 
specifically when life cycle stages are considered, since we showed statistical significance 
among our tested leverages and its determinants, we also provide empirical evidence on 
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the introduction of the life cycle concept as one more explanatory factor to be taken into 
account when studying the capital structure of companies in Iberian firms’ samples. In 
fact, our results suggest that Iberian firms, especially in growth and mature stages, follow 
a target capital structure and try to adjust it on its behalf. 
For the total leverage, our results support the evidence of Ahsan et al. (2016) and Rehman 
et al. (2016), who argued that companies adjust their capital structure in the stages of 
growth, maturity and decline. However, for the short- and long-term leverage, our results 
for the decline stage show that firms do not follow an optimal capital structure, which is 
not consistent with these authors. 
As such, our work has added, to the already diverse literature on capital structure, a 
dynamic explanatory factor: the business life cycle. This contribution provides a more 
insightful understanding of firms' decisions about their capital structure by differentiating 
themselves from the "normal" determinants of the capital structure. 
As the limitations of our study we appoint: i) the low number of firm year observations 
registered for the growth (87) and decline stages (91); ii) the exclusion of some variables 
initially included in our baseline model because of its high VIF; and iii) the fact that the 
sample period includes an “atypical” period such as that of the 2008 financial crisis and 
2012 Sovereign Debt crisis, as it makes it more difficult to generalize the results of our 
study to "more normal" periods. 
For future researches in this area, we suggest: i) a study with a higher number of 
observations; ii) a complete analysis which includes all the variables included in our 
baseline model; iii) the examination of the impact of 2008 and 2012 financial crisis 
(validating its’ impact not only in the relationship between capital structure and life cycle, 
but also in the leverage adjustment rate calculated for each life stage); and iv) the 
regression of these models with GMM (Generalized Method of Moments). 
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